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LECTURE
At the request of the Washington University School of Law and the
Washington University Environmental Law Society, on September 14,
1992, Sir Geoffrey Palmer visited Washington University School of Law
and delivered the following lecture.
Sir Geoffrey Palmer is the former Prime Minister, Attorney General,
and Minister for the Environment of New Zealand. He received a bache-
lor's degree and a LL.B. from Victoria University of Wellington and re-
ceived a J.D. from the University of Chicago. He is the author of
numerous books and articles including Environmental Politics: A Green-
print for New Zealand and Unbridled Power. Palmer is currently a Pro-
fessor of Law at Victoria University of Wellington and the Mason Ladd
Distinguished Visiting Professor of Law at the University of Iowa.
THE EARTH SUMMIT: WHAT WENT
WRONG AT RIO?
SIR GEOFFREY PALMER*
I. INTRODUCTION
The events at Rio de Janeiro in June of 1992 are a worthy subject of
inquiry. Within a brief compass it is possible only to provide a general
perspective on a massive amount of material.
* P.C., K.C.M.G., A.C., was formerly Minister for the Environment and Prime Minister of
New Zealand; 1991 Laureate, United Nations Environment Programme Global 500 Roll of Honor;
Member, International Advisory Council, World Wide Fund for Nature. The author is grateful to
his research assistant Christina King of the Class of 1993 College of Law, University of Iowa, for
assistance with this article.
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Two further caveats are necessary at the outset. Nothing here is at-
tributable to the New Zealand government, which was good enough to
make me an official delegate to the United Nations Conference on Envi-
ronment and Development ("UNCED") at Rio.' These are my personal
opinions. It is not my purpose to attack the international environmental
policies of the United States or its performance at Rio. If one were in-
clined to do so, ample opportunity exists, but such is not the mission
here.2
The subject is the question "What went wrong at Rio?" This inquiry
assumes that something did go wrong, though it is not a self-evident
proposition. Some believe the United Nations Conference on Environ-
ment and Development was a success. To count the conference as a
failure it would be necessary to demonstrate that it would have been bet-
ter had it not taken place. It is clear, however, that a number of things
were accomplished at Rio which will make a positive contribution to the
state of the world's environment. To assess the achievements of such a
comprehensive and complex set of diplomatic negotiations is not simple.
1. I was not able to attend the whole Conference, which lasted two weeks. But I was able to
attend the negotiations for a week at Rio Centro and speak at the Global Forum. At the invitation
of the Oceans Institute of Canada, I delivered an address to the Oceans Day of the Global Forum on
June 8, 1992 entitled Towards a New Oceans Order (on file with the Washington University Law
Quarterly).
2. Indeed, the stance of the United States has been criticized by officials of the administration
itself. William K. Reilly, the administrator of the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency ("EPA"),
stated in a memorandum to all EPA employees:
Another key question, frankly, is why did the United States play such a low-key defensive
game in preparing for Rio? We assigned a low priority to the negotiations of the biodivers-
ity treaty, were slow to engage the climate issue, were last to commit our President to
attend Rio. We put our delegation together late and we committed few resources. No
doubt this contributed to the negative feelings toward the United States.
William K. Reilly, Memorandum to All EPA Employees: Reflections on the Earth Summit 4 (July
15, 1992) (on file with the Washington University Law Quarterly).
3. See, e.g., Malaysian Foreign Minister Calls Rio Summit a Success, AGENCE FRANCE
PRESSE, June 17, 1992, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Currnt File (reporting that the meeting
of 115 heads of state to discuss environmental issues in Rio was a success); Peter Samuel, Green for
Go in Rio's Afterglow, WASH. TIMES, June 17, 1992, at G4 (discussing successes from environmen-
talists' point of view); Philip Shabecoff, Earth Summit: After the Carnival in Rio- What?, AM. POL.
NETWORK GREENWIRE, June 18, 1992, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Currut File (discussing
successes and failures at Rio); EC Tax Commissioner, Parliament Differ on Success of U.N. Earth
Summit in Rio, INT'L ENV. DAILY (BNA), July 22, 1992, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Cur-
rent File (EC Commissioner's impressions of Rio's successes); Rio Raised Environmental Commit-
ment in United States, New Survey Finds, INT'L ENv. DAILY (BNA), Aug. 6, 1992, available in
LEXIS, Nexis Library, Currnt File (reporting that four out of five Americans' environmental con-
sciousness was raised by Rio).
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Overall, however, skepticism is prudent.4
More should have been achieved for the future of the environment.
The big failure of Rio was a failure of political leadership, commitment
and vision. Many opportunities were lost. Rio scores barely a passing
grade, although it is possible that, in time, the achievement will blossom
into meaningful environmental progress. How quickly and to what ex-
tent this may occur cannot now be predicted.
A great deal was promised for Rio, and perhaps it was not reasonable
to expect that it could meet these expectations. The general rhetoric sug-
gested that this was the Conference to save the world. Such statements
were reinforced even as the Secretary-General Maurice Strong opened
the Conference, stating that UNCED "will define the state of political
will to save our planet." 5 Many of the speeches of the world leaders who
addressed the Conference expressed rhetorical flourishes of a similar na-
ture. Although the level of rhetoric had been high since 1989, actions
did not match that rhetoric. In theory, the need for international envi-
ronmental governance is supported strongly by many countries. But,
when it comes to implementing the theory, the commitment is much
weaker.
II. JUDGING THE EARTH SUMMIT: WHAT STANDARD?
By what standard should the Earth Summit be judged? Only defining
the appropriate standard to apply allows an answer to the question:
What went wrong at Rio? Several tests can be used in this analysis. It
may be helpful to consider some of them in the form of questions:
(1) Did the Conference raise the consciousness of people around
the world about the importance of global environmental issues?
(2) Has UNCED produced an international consensus which will
ensure a new approach to protecting the environment?
(3) Did UNCED meet the goals that were set for it at the time of
its conception?
(4) Did the Conference agree on binding and specific measures
4. See The Earth Summit Debacle, 22 ECOLOGIST 122 (1992). The Ecologist devoted its en-
tire July/August 1992 issue to the question, "'Whose common future?" The criticism of the entire
Earth Summit enterprise is scathing, including the charge that the Summit was, in essence, a "delib-
erate evasion of the central issues." Id.
5 Maurice F. Strong, Statement by Maurice F. Strong, Secretary-General, United Nations
Conference on Environment and Development at the Opening of the United Nations Conference on
Environment and Development (June 3, 1992) (transcript available from UNCED).
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which will make a significant contribution to halting environmental
degradation and producing global security?
There is no doubt that the UNCED process substantially raised the
level of environmental consciousness around the world. Leaders and
governments were forced to focus on the environmental issues, set con-
crete environmental policies and defend those positions in extensive ne-
gotiations at the international level. Furthermore, the general public's
awareness of environmental issues and the need for action was undoubt-
edly enhanced. There was a great deal of publicity surrounding Rio, and
the Conference certainly resulted in an increase in educated awareness of
pressing environmental issues.
The agreements at Rio contained a wide range of detailed issues.
While many of the agreements did not rise to the level of binding interna-
tional legal obligations, it is conceivable that the consensus reached will
form the basis for new norms to emerge that will be followed in the fu-
ture. A whole range of material now exists by which to measure the
actions of governments and hold them accountable.
Yet Rio did not produce enough binding new principles of interna-
tional environmental law sufficient to protect the environment against
known threats or secure its future. Clearly, UNCED failed to meet the
expectations established in the resolutions of the United Nations General
Assembly which created it. Neither did the meeting change the essential
quality of international environmental law which "lacks a centralised
authority for creation and enforcement of law."6 Nor did the Rio meet-
ing establish institutions likely to be effective in producing a new
approach to environmental problems. Rio did not elicit the one develop-
ment that is essential to changing the condition of the global environ-
ment: "formal abandonment of the idea that the principle of individual
state consent continues to represent a fundamental defining characteristic
of the international legal system."7 The necessary structural adjustments
were not made at Rio-they were not even addressed. 8
6. Thomas Gehring, International Environmental Regimes: Dynamic Sectoral Legal Systems,
in 1991 YEARBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 35, 38 (1991).
7. Giinther Handl, Environment Security and Global Change: The Challenge to International
Law, in 1991 YEARBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAw 3, 33 (1991).
8. Chapter 39 of Agenda 21 "International Legal Institutions and Mechanisms" contains
hardly anything of substance.
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol70/iss4/1
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III. THE ROAD TO Rio
What was the purpose of holding the unprecedented environmental
jamboree for two weeks in June 1992 at Rio de Janeiro? It was the larg-
est and most costly diplomatic gathering in the history of the entire
world.9 The purpose of Rio is set out in a lengthy 1989 General Assem-
bly Resolution. 10 We must look back to 1972, to the Stockholm meet-
ing,"' to find the origins of Rio. Canadian diplomat and businessman
Maurice Strong was the chairman at that meeting. 2 He was also
Secretary-General of the 1992 UNCED conference. 13 In retrospect, the
achievements at Stockholm seem quite considerable, although as Strong
himself said at Rio, "the hopes ignited at Stockholm remain largely un-
fulfilled." 4 The Stockholm conference led to establishment of ministries
for the environment all over the world, and it led to establishment of the
United Nations Environment Programme ("UNEP").'5 The Stockholm
Declaration attracted 103 affirmative votes, twelve abstentions and no
negative votes.6 In addition, the Stockholm meeting raised the world's
9 In his closing address, Maurice Strong described UNCED as "the largest high-level inter-
governmental conference ever held on our planet." Maurice F. Strong, Closing Statement at United
Nations Conference on Environment and Development, Rio de Janiero, Brazil 5 (June 14, 1992)
(transcript available from UNCED). Heads of government from approximately 115 nations partici-
pated, in contrast to Stockholm, where only two heads of government were present. David Segal,
Strong's Wrongs: Rio's Two-Faced Impresario; Earth Summit Secretary General Maurice Strong,
NEW REPUBLIC, June 22, 1992, at 13. One UNEP official told me privately at Rio that he esti-
mated the costs of holding UNCED, including money spent by governments' preparations, would
total approximately half a billion dollars.
10. United Nations Conference on Environment and Development, G.A. Res. 44/228, U.N.
GAOR, 44th Sess., Supp. No. 49, U.N. Doc. A/44/49 (1990) [hereinafter 1989 Resolution]; United
Nations Conference on Environment and Development, G.A. Res. 43/196, U.N. GAOR, 43d Sess.,
Supp. No. 49, U.N. Doc. A/43/49 (1989) [hereinafter 1988 Resolution].
11. The Stockholm meeting was held exactly 20 years before the Rio conference. U.N. CON-
FERENCE ON THE HUMAN ENVIRONMENT at 3, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.48/14/Rev. 1, U.N. Sales No.
E.73.11.A. 14 (1973).
12. See Segal, supra note 9, at 13.
13. Id. See also Strong, supra note 5.
14. Strong, supra note 5, at 3.
15. Institutional and Financial Arrangements for International Environmental Co-operation,
G.A. Res. 2997.27, U.N. GAOR Supp. No. 30, at 43, U.N. Doc. A/8730 (1972), reprinted in INTER-
NATIONAL ORGANIZATION AND INTEGRATION 460 (Louis Sohn ed., 1986). For a complete collec-
tion of official documents relating to UNEP, see UNEP, COMPENDIUM OF LEGISLATIVE
AUTHORITY (1978) [hereinafter UNEP COMPENDIUM].
16. Stockholm Declaration of the U.N. Conference on the Human Environment, June 16, 1972,
U N. Doc. A/CONF.48/14 (1972), 11 I.L.M. 1416 (1972) (adopted with no roll call vote recorded)
[hereinafter Stockholm Declaration]; see also BASIC DOCUMENTS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW AND
WORLD ORDER 691 (Burns H. Weston et al. eds., 2d ed. 1990).
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level of consciousness about environmental issues.
One tell-tale sign of the lack of success at Rio compared with Stock-
holm involved the issue of whaling.17 Rio did not secure an international
commitment to ban whaling, whereas at Stockholm a ban on whaling
had been agreed upon." A resolution was passed at Stockholm calling
for a moratorium on whaling,' 9 which the International Whaling Com-
mission later implemented.2 ° Yet, in 1992, Rio was unable to secure the
same degree of agreement on whaling even though an agreement on
whaling should have been less controversial in 1992 than it had been in
1972.21
Fifteen years after the Stockholm meeting the significant report of the
World Commission on Environment and Development, entitled Our
17. See infra notes 20-21.
18. Stockholm Declaration, supra note 16, at 1434.
19. The text of Resolution 33 reads: "It is recommended that Governments agree to strengthen
the international whaling commission, to increase international research efforts, and as a matter of
urgency to call for an international agreement, under the auspices of the international whaling com-
mission and all Governments concerned for a 10-year moratorium on commercial whaling." Id.
20. The International Whaling Commission was created in 1946 to oversee commercial whaling
practices. International Convention for the Regulation of Whaling, Dec. 2, 1946. Entered into
force, Nov. 10, 1948; 62 Stat. 2, 1716, T.I.A.S. No. 1849, 4 Bevans 248, 161 U.N.T.S. 72. The
Commission was responsible for implementing the resolution of the Stockholm Conference. Bill
Mansfield, Improved International Protection for Cetaceans: Proposed New Zealand Initiative at the
UNCED Prepcom III, Aug. 5, 1991, at 2 (Director-General of Conservation Briefing Paper to the
New Zealand Minister of Conservation) (on file with the Washington University Law Quarterly).
21. At Prep Com III, New Zealand made an Intervention on Small Cetaceans in order to
prompt action by the International Whaling Commission and the world community to make effec-
tive a moratorium on whaling and driftnet fishing. Draft UNCED Intervention on Small Cetaceans,
1991 (official statement of the New Zealand government on whaling and driftnet fishing to UNCED
Prep Com III) (on file with the Washington University Law Quarterly). Yet Prep Com IV's Working
Group II did not incorporate a ban on whaling into its statement of principles. Protection of the
Oceans and All Kinds of Seas, Including Enclosed and Semi-Enclosed Seas, and Coastal Areas and
the Protection, Rational Use, and Development of their Living Resources, Preparatory Committee for
the United Nations Conference on Environment and Development Working Group II, 4th Sess.,
Agenda Item 2, passim, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.151/PC/WG.II/L.16/Rev.I (1992).
Following the UNCED Conference in Rio, the International Whaling Commission held its annual
meeting in Glasgow, Scotland. This meeting erupted in controversy, as Norway, Iceland and Japan
made clear their intentions to resume whaling in the near future. Alexander MacLeod, World Whal-
ing Body Shaken by Attempts to Resume the Hunt, CHRISTIAN SCI. MO NITOR, July 6, 1992, at 3.
While the ban on whaling will be maintained for the next year, it appears unlikely that it will last
beyond 1993. Id. See also NZ Minister Hails Maintenance of Whaling Ban, AGENCE FRANCE
PRESSE, July 6, 1992, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Currnt File; International Whaling Com-
'Mission Draws Fire from Pro-Whaling Group, INT'L ENVTL. DAILY (BNA), July 7, 1992, available
in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Intenv File; IWC Maintains Moratorium on Whaling: Rules Japan Cat-
not Hunt Minke Whales, INT'L ENVTL. DAILY (BNA), July 8, 1992, available in LEXIS, Nexis
Library, Intenv File.
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Common Future, was released. 22  The report, issued in 1987--often
called the Brundtland report after its chair, the Prime Minister of Nor-
way-was a document of great importance to the international environ-
mental movement. 23  The report linked economic and environmental
issues in a way that the Stockholm declaration had failed to do.24 It set
forth a vision for the future: one based on sustainable development.
25
The report's vision was especially appealing because it argued that the
world can have economic growth, eliminate poverty, and that it can be
done in an environmentally sound and sustainable fashion.26 To posit
that it is possible to have economic growth within the limits of ecological
integrity is an attractive prospect. This concept was the foundation for
the Rio Declaration-the main statement of principle which emerged
from UNCED.27
But is such sustainable development possible? There is substantial di-
22 WORLD COMMISSION ON ENVIRONMENT AND DEVELOPMENT, OUR COMMON FUTURE
(1987) [hereinafter BRUNDTLAND REPORT].
23. Id.
24 Id. at 67-91.
25 According to the Brundtland Commission, sustainable development requires:
" a political system that secures effective citizen participation in decision making;
* an economic system that is able to generate surpluses and technical knowledge on a
self-reliant and sustained basis;
* a social system that provides for solutions for the tensions arising from disharmonious
development;
" a production system that respects the obligation to preserve the ecological basis for
development;
" a technological system that can search continuously for new solutions;
" an international system that fosters sustainable patterns of trade and finance; and,
" an administrative system that is flexible and has the capacity for self-correction.
Id. at 65.
26 The Commission wrote:
Humanity has the ability to make development sustainable-to ensure that it meets the
needs of the present without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their
own needs. The concept of sustainable devlopment does imply limits-not absolute limits
but limitations imposed by the present state of technology and social organization on envi-
ronmental resources and by the ability of the biosphere to absorb the effects of human
activities. But technology and social organization can be both managed and improved to
make way for a new era of economic growth. The Commission believes that widespread
poverty is no longer inevitable. Poverty is not only an evil in itself, but sustainable develop-
ment requires meeting the basic needs of all and extending to all the opportunity to fulfill
their aspirations for a better life.
Id. at 8.
27. The Rio Declaration on Environment and Development, United Nations Conference of En-
vironment and Development, Agenda Item 9, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.151/5/Rev.1 (1992) [hereinafter
Rio Declaration]. See also William K. Stevens, Earth Summit Finds the Years of Optimism Are a
Fading Memor N.Y. TIMES, June 9, 1992, at C4 (analyzing the bases for Rio as traceable to Stock-
holm and to the Brundtland Report).
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vergence of opinion about this possibility. The politics behind the princi-
ple, however, are good. It comprises a matrix that binds those who
believe in the need to protect the environment with those who want eco-
nomic growth and development. Also, it provides a framework under
which both developed and developing countries can find common
ground. The power of the concept begins to disintegrate, however, when
one attempts to break it down into its constituent elements and make
practical decisions to implement the idea. At that point, the starkness of
the choices becomes evident and consensus is more difficult to attain. To
some degree this explains the difficulty at Rio.
In any event, the Brundtland report produced an international impetus
to the view that there is a need to take concerted global action on a
number of issues. Thus, the United Nations began to debate possible
actions to be taken to address environmental issues. In 1988 and 1989,
the General Assembly passed a series of resolutions that set up the
United Nations Conference on Environment and Development-the
Earth Summit.28 The main U.N. resolution is quite long, about six
pages, including all the preambular paragraphs. The standards set forth
in the resolution are one measure by which to judge the Earth Summit,
because they set forth the program which the Earth Summit was sup-
posed to address. In the preambular paragraphs, the 1989 resolution
stated that nations are deeply concerned by the continuing deterioration
of the environment and by the serious degradation of global life-support
systems.29 If such trends are allowed to continue, disruption of the
global ecological balance could occur, which may jeopardize the life sus-
taining qualities of the Earth and lead to an ecological catastrophe.30
The Brundtland report recognized that decisive, urgent, and global ac-
tion is vital to protect the ecological balance of the Earth.31 Indeed, after
a series of other alarming preambular paragraphs in the 1989 resolution,
the United Nations General Assembly went on to agree that
[T]he following environmental issues, which are not listed in any particular
order of priority, are among those of major concern in maintaining the
quality of the Earth's environment and especially in achieving environmen-
tally sound and sustainable development in all countries:
28. See supra note 10.
29. See 1989 Resolution, supra note 10, at 152.
30. Id.
31. See BRUNDTLAND REPORT, supra note 22, at 1-2.
[Vol. 70:1005
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(a) Protection of the atmosphere by combating climate change, deple-
tion of the ozone layer, and transboundary air pollution;
(b) Protection of the quality and supply of fresh water resources;
(c) Protection of the oceans and all kinds of seas, including enclosed
and semi-enclosed seas, and of coastal areas and the protection, rational use
and development of their living resources;
(d) Protection and management of land resources by, inter alia, com-
bating the deforestation, desertification and drought;
(e) Conservation of biological diversity;
(f) Environmentally sound management of biotechnology;
(g) Environmentally sound management of wastes, particularly hazard-
ous wastes, and of toxic chemicals, as well as prevention of illegal interna-
tional traffic of toxic and dangerous products;
(h) Improvement of the living and working environment of the poor in
urban slums and rural areas through eradicating poverty .... 32
This is certainly an ambitious agenda. Indeed, one of the major difficul-
ties with Rio was that much was said about it in the planning stages, and
expectations were raised which were hard to satisfy.33  In fact, the
agenda that was set was so fixed, wide, and embracing that it constituted
a challenge that would not be met.34
32. See 1989 Resolution, supra note 10, at 153.
33. Rhetoric surrounding the development of Agenda 21 was filled with measures for action in
economic and environmental development in coming years. Much was made of the Rio Confer-
ence's role in spurring global cooperation and sustainable development. Yet some analysts have
concluded that national interests played a key role in defeating the broad policy ideals that were set
forth before commencement of the conference. See Julia Preston & Eugene Robinson, National
Interests Preside at Rio: Rhetoric of Global Cooperation Does Not Suffuse Back Rooms, WASH. POST,
June 7, 1992, at A28.
34. Agenda 21 sets forth 40 chapters of concerns to be addressed by the UNCED Conference.
These topics include: International Cooperation to Accelerate Sustainable Development in Develop-
ing Countries and Related Domestic Policies (Chapter 2); Combating Poverty (Chapter 3); Chang-
ing Consumption Patterns (Chapter 4); Demographic Dynamics and Sustainability (Chapter 5);
Protecting and Promoting Human Health (Chapter 6); Promoting Sustainable Human Settlement
Development (Chapter 7); Integrating Environment and Development in Decision-Making (Chapter
8); Protection of the Atmosphere (Chapter 9); Integrated Approach to the Planning and Manage-
ment of Land Resources (Chapter 10); Combating Deforestation (Chapter 11); Managing Fragile
Ecosystems: Combating Decertification and Drought (Chapter 12); Managing Fragile Ecosystems:
Sustainable Mountain Development (Chapter 13); Promoting Sustainable Agriculture and Rural De-
velopment (Chapter 14); Conservation of Biological Diversity (Chapter 15); Environmentally Sound
Management of Biotechnology (Chapter 16); Protection of Oceans, All Kinds of Seas, Including
Enclosed and Semi-Enclosed Seas, and Coastal Areas and the Protection, Rational Use and Develop-
ment of their Living Resources (Chapter 17); Protection of the Quality and Supply of Freshwater
Resources: Application of Integrated Approaches to the Development, Management and Use of
Water Resources (Chapter 18); Environmentally Sound Management of Toxic Chemicals, Including
Washington University Open Scholarship
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The techniques adopted to meet the challenge at Rio were inevitably
the techniques of international diplomacy. For those who have not la-
bored through a series of international meetings, those techniques merit a
brief description. The tools of international diplomacy are cumbersome.
They are based on consensus; there must be agreement to make effective
policies possible. If 180 nations negotiate, 180 nations must agree. Is-
sues are often discussed to the point of exhaustion, and there is fre-
quently little progress toward policy development. Time is usually quite
limited, and such international meetings are extremely difficult to con-
duct. It would probably be difficult to secure the agreement of 180 na-
tions at an international diplomatic gathering that the earth is round, let
alone what steps need to be taken to preserve it. Bruce Babbit has cor-
rectly described the Rio proceedings as "a chaotic process more akin to a
street brawl than a diplomatic meeting."35
So what happened, in order to manage the techniques of multilateral
diplomacy effectively, at the UNCED meetings in Rio? Preparatory
Committees were set up-or Prep Coins, as they are called in the United
Nations vernacular. 36 Four Prep Corns were held at various times and
Prevention of Illegal International Traffic in Toxic and Dangerous Products (Chapter 19); Environ.
mentally Sound Management of Hazardous Wastes, Including Prevention of Illegal International
Traffic in Hazardous Wastes (Chapter 20); Environmentally Sound Management of Solid Wastes
and Sewage-Related Issues (Chapter 21); Safe and Environmentally Sound Management of Radioac-
tive Wastes (Chapter 22); Strengthening the Role of Major Groups: Preamble (Chapter 23); Global
Action for Women Towards Sustainable and Equitable Development (Chapter 24); Children and
Youth in Sustainable Development (Chapter 25); Recognizing and Strengthening the Role of Indige-
nous People and their Communities (Chapter 26); Strengthening the Role of Non-Governmental
Organizations: Partners for Sustainable Development (Chapter 27); Local Authorities: Initiatives in
Support of Agenda 21 (Chapter 28); Strengthening the Role of Workers and their Trade Unions
(Chapter 29); Strengthening the Role of Business and Industry (Chapter 30); Scientific and Techno-
logical Community (Chapter 31); Strengthening the Role of Farmers (Chapter 32); Means of Imple-
mentation: Financial Resources and Mechanisms (Chapter 33); Environmentally Sound Technology:
Transfer, Cooperation and Capacity-Building (Chapter 34); Science for Sustainable Development
(Chapter 35); Promoting Education, Public Awareness and Training (Chapter 36); National Mecha-
nisms and International Cooperation for Capacity-Building in Developing Countries (Chapter 37);
International Institutional Arrangements (Chapter 38); International Legal Instruments and Mecha-
nisms (Chapter 39); Information for Decision-Making (Chapter 40). Adoption of Agreements on
Environment and Development: Agenda 21, United Nations Conference on Environment and Devel-
opment, Provisional Agenda Item 9, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.151/4 (Parts I-IV) (1992) [hereinafter
Agenda 21]. Arguably, the range of topics may be unmanagably wide. Possibly, with closer atten-
tion to defining, the priorities could have been better achieved. On the other hand, serious environ-
mental problems exist over a broad field and are often interrelated.
35. Bruce Babbit, After Rio, WORLD MONITOR, June 1992, at 28, 30.
36. See 1989 Resolution, supra note 10, at 154. See also Report of the Preparatory Committee
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol70/iss4/1
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places around the world.3 7 These meetings are really negotiations about
negotiations. They have all the same cumbersome impedimentia of
multi-lateral diplomacy as negotiations conducted at the United Nations.
Incredibly long-winded arguments, with a lot of language put in square
brackets, are par for the course.38 Representatives of many nations at-
tended these preliminary meetings, where they thrashed through draft
after draft of what was to be agreed upon at Rio. There was opportunity
in the Prep Com meetings for nations to protect their own self-interests,
and many nations did. Obviously, this occurs in many international ne-
gotiations. But when considering environmental issues, it is necessary
for nations to lift their sights above their own immediate self-interests.
Unfortunately, this did not happen much at Rio. For example, nations
such as Saudi Arabia, which are well endowed with oil and do not wish
international policies to restrict the use of that oil, will resist environmen-
tal policies that conflict with oil producing interests. Saudia Arabia in
fact advanced arguments which were egregiously self-interested. 39 At
Rio and in the associated negotiations, too many nations concentrated on
their own self-interests without looking adequately at the collective inter-
est of all nations-which is, after all, the heart of the global environmen-
tal problem.
IV. THE FRUITS OF RIO
The main outputs of UNCED were:
" The Rio Declaration-a short statement of principles revolving around
sustainability; 40
" Agenda 21-an enormous action plan of forty chapters comprising rec-
ommendations to governments;4 1
* A Declaration on Forests which had been intended as a hard law con-
vention but could not be agreed upon;4 2
for the United Nations Conference on Environment and Development, United Nations Conference on
Environment and Development, 46th Sess., U.N. Doc. A/46/48 (1991).
37. The first two Prep Corns were held in New York and Nairobi, and the second two Prep
Corn, were held in Geneva, as mandated in the 1989 Resolution. See 1989 Resolution, supra note
10, at 154.
38 Square brackets mean: "we do not agree on this formulation, but we might agree later."
39. See U.S. May Try to Derail the Rio Declaration: It Wants Language Changes in Action-
Oriented Plans, STAR TRIB., June 10, 1992, at 2A. "A proposal to reduce air pollution, urban smog,
and acid rain was being blocked by Saudia Arabia, which fears a drop in oil revenues . Id.
40. See Rio Declaration, supra note 27.
41. See Agenda 21, supra note 34.
42. Statement of Principles for a Global Consensus on the Management, Conservation, and
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* A Convention on Biological Diversity;43
" A Framework Convention on Climate Change;
a
"
• An agreement within the context of Agenda 21 to establish a Sustaina-
ble Development Commission to monitor the progress in implementing
the Rio Declaration.4 5
The two conventions-the Rio Framework Convention on Climate
Change and the Convention on Biological Diversity-comprised the only
hard law output from Rio. Rio was unnecessary for their negotiation or
their existence. Both of these measures were negotiated by separate
processes, and the UNCED machinery was not used. The measures ap-
pear to have been attached to UNCED in order to give weighty appear-
ance to the proceedings and to add symbolism. The UNCED'machinery,
in contrast, was concerned with the Rio Declaration, Agenda 21 and the
Forestry Declaration. I will now briefly discuss each of these
instruments.
A. , The Rio Declaration
The leading document produced at the 1992 Rio Conference was the
Rio Declaration.46 The Rio Declaration, like many declarations con-
cluded at massive international meetings, was not intended to be a con-
vention containing enforceable treaty obligations. Nations usually prefer
soft law documents; they like to agree to high-sounding resolutions of
principle that do not actually require them to do anything very specific
later.47 The Rio Declaration is such a soft law agreement. Nevertheless,
Sustainable Development of All Types of Forests, June 13, 1992, 31 I.L.M. 881 [hereinafter Forest
Principles].
43. Convention on Biological Diversity, opened for signature June 5, 1992, 31 I.L.M. 818 [here-
inafter Biodiversity Convention]
44. Framework Convention on Global Climate Change, opened for signature June 5, 1992, 31
I.L.M. 849 [hereinafter Climate Change Convention].
45. See Agenda 21, supra note 34, at ch. 38.
46. See Rio Declaration, supra note 27.
47. See generally Pierre-Marie Dupuy, Soft Law and the International Law of the Environment,
12 MICH. J. INT'L L. 420 (1991); Christine Chinken, The Challenge of Soft Law: Development and
Change in International Law, 38 INT'L & COMp. L.Q. 850 (1989); A Hard Look at Soft Law, 82
ASIL PROC. 371 (1988); W. Riphagen, From Soft Law to fus Cogens and Back, 17 VICTORIA U.
WELLINGTON L. REV. 81 (1987); John Kin Gamble, Jr., The 1982 United Nations Convention on the
Law of the Sea as Soft Law, 8 HOUSTON J. INT'L L. 37 (1985); Jonathan Carlson, Hunger, Agricul-
tural Trade Liberalization, and Soft International Law: Addressing the Legal Dimensions of a Polit-
ical Problem, 70 IOWA L. REV. 1187 (1985); Tadeusz Gruchalla-Wesierski, A Framework for
Understanding "Soft Law," 30 MCGILL L.J. 37 (1984); Joseph Gold, Strengthening the Soft Interna-
tional Law of Exchange Arrangements, 77 A.J.I.L. 443 (1983).
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the Rio Declaration contains a set of mission statements which would be
of substantial benefit if adopted around the world.
The Rio Declaration is based on the principle of sustainable develop-
ment.4" Almost everything in the Rio Declaration points to the need to
adopt sustainable development policies.49 It does not, however, enunci-
ate how to do this, nor does it explain the legal and policy content of
sustainable development. Indeed, even having spent three years as Min-
ister for the Environment in New Zealand, and having based an entire
resource management law on sustainable development,"0 it is my view
that the legal and policy ambiguities raised by the issue of sustainable
development were not adequately discussed, much less resolved. For ex-
ample, how does one balance the economic interests of future generations
against the economic interests of present generations? How can one bal-
ance the question of ecological bottom lines against the question of com-
munities' individual interests and jobs, and short-term economic
advancement? These issues are difficult to resolve. Nations need more
guidance on how to confront these issues than the high sounding princi-
ples contained in the Rio Declaration. Presumably, additional guidance
is intended to come from the detailed action plan in Agenda 21, although
it is doubtful that it does.
Principle One of the Rio Declaration states that: "Human beings are at
the centre of concerns for sustainable development. They are entitled to
a healthy and productive life and harmony with nature."'" Principle
Three states: "The right to develop it must be fulfilled so as to equitably
meet development and environmental needs of present and future genera-
tions."-5 2 "In order to achieve sustainable development," Principle Four
states, "environmental protection shall constitute an integral part of the
developmental process and cannot be considered in isolation from it."53
Principle 5 continues: "All states and all people shall cooperate in the
essential task of eradicating poverty as an indispensable requirement for
48. See Rio Declaration, supra note 27, passim.
49. Id.
50. Resource Management Act. I N.Z. Stat. 69 (1991). This ambitious act has as its objective
"to integrate the Laws relating to resource management and to set up a resource management system
that promotes sustainable management of natural and physical resources." Id. The Act is 382 pages
long and replaces some 75 statutes. It integrates existing laws for the management of land, water,
and soil. coastal areas, and pollution control. It came into force on October 1, 1991.
51, See Rio Declaration, supra note 27, at 2.
52. Id. at 3.
53. Id.
1992] 1017
Washington University Open Scholarship
1018 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY
sustainable development . . ,,"4 The Declaration adds in Principle 6:
"The special situation and needs of developing countries, particularly the
least developed and those most environmentally vulnerable, shall be
given special priority."55 Principle Eight goes further: "To achieve sus-
tainable development and a higher quality of life for all people, States
should reduce and eliminate unsustainable patterns of production and
consumption and promote appropriate demographic policies."5s6 "Ap-
propriate," is a universal weasel word in international negotiations. Here
it was a code for saying, "we do not wish to address the population prob-
lem." Of all the issues critical to the future of the planet, the one most
assiduously avoided at Rio was population control. Obviously, the carry-
ing capacity of the planet is greatly affected by the amount of population
that it supports. 57 Because many nations did not want to address the
population issue, it was not addressed in a meaningful way.58 It is true
that proper consideration of the issue cannot be divorced from the ques-
tion of levels of consumption. But where gains are made, high rates of
population growth can eliminate them.
The question of sustainable development, as outlined in the Rio Decla-
ration, owes much to the Brundtland Commission's report.5 9 How will
the world attain sustainable development? The Rio Declaration states
that sustainability is the driving force of international environmental pol-
icy.60 It certainly attracted widespread support at Rio. But what does it
mean? The Rio documents contain few answers to this question. The
principle of sustainable development is no doubt important. But it is
important to resolve the internal conceptual contradictions and not try to
paper over them. Specificity and intellectual rigour cannot be indefinitely
suspended from the analysis of its ingredients.61
54. Id.
55. Id.
56. Id. at 5 (emphasis added).
57. See Garrett Hardin, The Tragedy of the Commons, 162 SCIENCE 1243 (1968). See also
WILLIAM OPHuLs, ECOLOGY AND THE POLITICS OF SCARCITY 146-47 (1977).
58. See supra note 34.
59. See BRUNDTLAND REPORT, supra note 22, at 43-66; see also Stevens, supra note 27, at C4.
60. See Rio Declaration, supra note 27, passim.
61. The most useful work I have seen on the subject is MICHAEL R. REDCLIFT, SUSTAINABLE
DEVELOPMENT: EXPLORING THE CONTRADICTIONS (1987).
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B. Agenda 21
Agenda 21 contains forty chapters.62 It is an action plan that sets out,
under a large range of different headings, actions that nations should be
taking to preserve the environment and to promote sustainable develop-
ment.63 Although not legally binding because it is only an action plan
and agenda, it was negotiated by consensus.' In the course of time, as-
pects of it could ripen into norms of customary international law. Be-
cause it was negotiated by consensus, it tends to have quite a lot of gaps
in it where nations could not agree.65 The Agenda contains much horta-
tory language and quite a lot of mush.
One basic feature of Agenda 21 is that it is going to cost money-a lot
of money. In the Rio process, there was a requirement to assess the
financial costs of the recommended actions.66 To mend our environmen-
tal ways worldwide and to implement all the elements in the forty chap-
ters of Agenda 21, the Rio Action Plan,67 the UNCED secretariat
estimated that it would cost annually "$600 billion, including about $125
billion on grant or concessional terms from the international commu-
62. See Agenda 21, supra note 34, passim.
63. Id.
64. Id. at pmbl., 1.3. "Agenda 21 addresses the pressing problems of today and also aims at
preparing the world for the challenges of the next century. It reflects a global consensus and polit-
ical commitment at the highest level on development and environment cooperation." Id.
65. Examples of these gaps abound. Food and agricultural development, population and
human resources, and energy are examples of issues UNCED inadequately addressed. See, eg.,
BRUNDTLAND REPORT, supra note 22, passim (offering a host of topics for resolution by UNCED,
few of which were addressed signficantly by Agenda 21). See also Greenpeace International, Sub-
mission to the United Nations Conference on Environment and Development: A Document for
Consideration by the Secretary-General in the Preparation for the Second Preparatory Committee of
the UNCED, Mar.-Apr. 1991 (offering yet more topics that UNCED was unable to address ade-
quately in Agenda 21) (on file with the Washington University Law Quarterly).
66. See Agenda 21, supra note 34, at pmbl., 1.4.
The developmental and environmental objectives of Agenda 21 will require a substantial
flow of new and additional financial resources to developing countries, in order to cover
incremental costs for the actions they have to undertake to deal with global environmental
problems and to accelerate sustainable development. Financial resources are also required
for strengthening the capacity of international institutions for the implementation of
Agenda 21. An indicative order of magnitude assessment of costs is included in each of the
programme areas. This assessment will need to be examined and refined by the relevant
implementing agencies and organizations.
Id.
67. Michael Weisskopf & Julia Preston, U. N. Earth Summit Opens With Calls to Save Planet,
WASH. POST, June 4, 1992, at A20. Strong intended that more than half the money come from
developed nations. Id.
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nity."6 Significant new funds were pledged at Rio; Japan and the EC, in
particular, pledged new financial commitments, but nothing near the tar-
get of $125 billion was achieved.69 We are left in a frustrating situation:
even if there is agreement on what needs to be done to combat environ-
mental damage on an international scale, it appears it will not be funded.
It was agreed, however, that there would be a restructuring of the Global
Environmental Facility.70
C. The Declaration on Forests
The third output of Rio was a Declaration on Forests. 1 Prior to the
Rio Conference, there was hope for negotiation of a binding hard-law
convention on forests, particularly tropical rainforests, which have a
number of very important consequences in the environment both in the
climate change and biodiversity areas. Nonetheless, the developing
countries steadfastly refused to conclude such a broad forest agreement
due to concerns about their development and economic growth.72 There-
fore, because it was impossible to negotiate binding commitments, only a
declaration emerged. Useful as it is, it does not comprise a hard-law set
of legal obligations to prevent continuation of massive deforestation prac-
tices, especially in the endangered rainforests. The negotiations on for-
estry at Rio were heavy, the focus of much disagreement and no little
confrontation between North and South.
68. Agenda 21, supra note 34, at pmbl., 1.4.
69. Id. Germany pledged $150 million. The U.S. pledged $50 million, as well as $25 million to
aid developing countries to inventory energy uses, and $150 million to help Third World nations
preserve their forests. Id. In addition, Japan agreed to increase aid, which has been $10 billion per
year. William K. Stevens, Bush Plan to Save Forests is Blocked by Poor Countries, N.Y. TIMEs, June
9, 1992, at Al.
70. Agenda 21, supra note 34, ch. 33, 33.16(iii).
71. See Forest Principles, supra note 42.
72. See Shabecoff, supra note 3. India and Malaysia were among the developing nations that
refused to sign the forest agreement. Id. Both India and Malaysia have issued highly unfavorable
reactions to the establishment of a comprehensive forest agreement.
Developing countries have argued that a distinction should be made between natural re-
sources like the atmosphere, which clearly are shared by the whole world, and those like
forests, which fall within national territories. "Trying to globalize forests is like saying oil
is a global resource," argued Kamal Nath, India's Environment and Forests Minister ....
A key country opposing the proposed forests convention was Malaysia, which has one of
the world's largest tropical forests and earns more than 40 percent of its income from
timber sales ....
"By no stretch of the imagination are we going to keep our forests in custody for some
other nation," said Ting Wen Lian, a member of the Malaysian delegation.
Preston & Robinson, supra note 33, at A28.
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There emerged at Rio some venom between North and South.7 3 In
broad terms, the issue was whether the North was going to make avail-
able the technology and wealth transfers that were necessary for the
South to conform to the new environmental standards, which they said
the North was imposing on them. This disagreement led to some bitter
exchanges. The divide between North and South seemed to intensify
over the two years of the preparatory meetings. With the allegiances of
the Cold War at an end, there was increased fluidity. The caucus of
developing nations, known as the G-77, includes more than 125 coun-
tries. They made heavy demands, which had begun in earnest at the
earlier negotiations of the instruments relating to the ozone layer.7 4
Sadly, these divisions were only papered over at Rio. No real resolu-
tion was attempted and no strategy emerged for resolving the issues. The
United States offered no real initiatives, and for the most part the rest of
the developed world was prepared to hide behind the American position.
Developed nations said, of course, that they did not agree with the
United States but, in fact, the American position provided them with
shelter. Creative policy development necessary to bridge the gap will
have to await another day.
1. Convention on Climate Change
The United States75 signed the Climate Change Convention agreed
upon at Rio.76  The Convention was, however, substantially watered
down at the insistence of the United States.77 It contained no specific
73. See Joel Achenbach, At Summit, Dueling Hemispheres: North-South Rift Over Overpopula-
tion, WASH. PosT, June 5, 1992, at Cl; Paul Lewis, Poor vs. Rich in Rio: If Development in Southern
Hemisphere Is to Be 'Green, North May Have to Pay, N.Y. TiMES, June 3, 1992, at A1. This conflict
was evident in the refusal of Third World nations, especially India and Malaysia, to agree to Bush's
forest plans. See supra note 72 and accompanying text.
74. The result was that India and China refused to ratify the relevant instrument unless in-
creased funding was made available to assist compliance. The United States Congress passed legisla-
tion authorizing higher levels of funding to assist developing nations contingent upon ratifications of
the instruments by India and China. Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990, 42 U.S.C.A. § 7671p(b)
(West 1991).
75. Framework Convention on Climate Change Signed, 3 U.S. DEP'T ST. DISPATCH 462 (1992)
(press release statement by President Bush).
76. See Climate Change Convention, supra note 44.
77. Michael Wines reported:
Last month, Mr. Bush successfully wielded a threat to boycott the Earth Summit to win
concessions from most of the world's nations on a global warming treaty, eliminating lan-
guage that would have required the United States to cap its emissions of carbon dioxide by
2000 at 1990 levels. The treaty now calls for "action plans" to reduce emissions of gases
that are thought to promote global warming, but does not mandate reductions.
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commitment regarding the level of emissions or future reduction of emis-
sions.7" Many nations were prepared to agree to specific targets, but the
United States was not; therefore, no targets appear in the Convention.
Views on climate change differ, although they do not differ as much
outside the United States. Nevertheless, the Climate Change Convention
flunked the major test because there was no agreement on targets for
reduction of emissions of greenhouse gas. Within the structure of the
Climate Change Convention, the means exist however, to achieve such
commitments by amending the Convention. Those amendments need
not be the result of consensus.79 Article 15 of the Climate Change Con-
vention states: "Amendments to the convention shall be adopted at an
ordinary session of the conference of the Parties." 0 The text of an
amendment is to be communicated at least six months before the
meeting.8'
The parties shall make every effort to reach agreement on any proposed
amendments to the Convention by consensus. If all efforts at consensus
have been exhausted and no agreement reached, the amendment shall as a
last resort be adopted by a three-fourths majority vote of the Parties present
and voting at the meeting.8 2
This constitutes the beginning of international legislation on climate
change. In the future, therefore, much may result from the Convention.
Michael Wines, Bush, Trying to Counter Criticism, Offers Plan to Save Earth's Forests, N.Y. TIMES,
June 2, 1992, at A4.
This insistence that the treaty be watered down stemmed, in part, from claims of scientific uncer-
tainty about global warming, and the costs necessary to implement strict standards for carbon diox-
ide emissions and control of CFCs. See generally Ed Rubenstein, Getting Hot in Rio: United
Nations Conference on Development and Environment Column, NAT'L REV., June 22, 1992, at 17.
In fact, the Bush adminstration has been accused of using fear of lost jobs to justify refusal to adhere
to stringent restrictions to stop global warming. See Senator Says U.S. Undermined in Rio by Mis-
guided Policies, Lack of Leadership, INT'L ENVTL. DAILY (BNA), June 24, 1992, available in
LEXIS, Nexis Library, Currnt File; U.S. Policy on the Environment and Development, 3 U.S. DEP'T
ST. DISPATCH 3 (1992) [hereinafter U.S. Policy).
78. See Climate Change Convention, supra note 44, at 855-59. But see Jeremy Leggett, Global
Warming: The Scientific Evidence and Its Implications, 2 TRANSNAT'L L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 1
(1992) (arguing that a climate change convention must contain protocols requiring deep cuts in
greenhouse gas emissions if any positive progress toward eliminating global warming is to occur);
David A. Wirth & Daniel A. Lashof, Beyond Vienna and Montreal: A Global Framework Convention
on Greenhouse Gases, 2 TRANSNAT'L L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 79 (1992) (arguing that any global
climate change treaty must include early and significant greenhouse gas reductions).
79. This is important because it creates a means to legislate measures to curb climate change in
the future.
80. See Climate Change Convention, supra note 44, at 868.
81. Id.
82. Id.
[Vol. 70:1005
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol70/iss4/1
1992] WHAT WENT WRONG AT RIO? 1023
Standards could be agreed to and imposed even when some nations do
not agree. Levels of carbon dioxide emissions could thereby be curtailed.
It will be necessary, however, to conduct many more extensive interna-
tional negotiations before the problem is seriously addressed by the inter-
national community, much less resolved. 3
E. Convention on Biodiversity
A Convention on Biological Diversity was signed at Rio. 4 The
United States chose not to sign this agreement because it feared problems
with economic development in biotechnology and interference with
United States patents.8 5
The Biodiversity Convention is important because a large proportion
of all species of plants and animals live in tropical rainforests s6 These
forests are being destroyed at the rate of seventeen million hectares a
year.8 7 This poses a very serious challenge to the future of humanity.
The magnitude of loss resulting from a decrease in biodiversity is not yet
known, which is one of the essential problems of biodiversity. The Bi-
odiversity Convention contains some useful provisions about identifica-
tion and monitoring of these rainforest resources (Article 7),"8 about
83, Id. For a detailed analysis of what will be required to produce an effective policy to combat
global warming, see Symposium, Confronting Global Warming, 2 TRANSNAT'L L. & CONTEMP.
PROBS. 1 (1992).
84. See Biodiversity Convention, supra note 43.
85. President Bush explained his reasoning for refusing to sign the Biological Diversity Conven-
tion as follows:
Many governments and many individuals from the United States and other nations have
pressed us to sign a treaty on what's called "biodiversity."..... The treaty's intent is no-
ble-to ensure protection of natural habitat for the world's plants and animal life.
The United States has better protection for species and habitat than any nation on earth.
An[d] no one disagrees with the goal of the treaty, but the truth is, it contains provisions
that have nothing-nothing-to do with biodiversity.
Take just one example. The private sector is proving it can help generate solutions to
our environmental problem. The treaty includes provisions that discourage technological
innovation, [and] treats them as common property even though they are developed at great
cost by private companies and American workers. We know what will happen: Remove
incentives and we'll see fewer of the technological advances that help protect our planet.
See U.S. Policy, supra note 77, at 3 (departure remarks of President Bush given at Andrews Air
Force Base on June 11, 1992). See also Keith Schneider, White House Snubs U.S. Envoy's Plea to
Sign Rio Treaty, N.Y. TIMES, June 5, 1992, at A6.
86. Hilary F. French, After the Earth Summit: The Future of Environmental Governance, 17
(Mar. 1992) (Worldwatch Paper No. 107).
87. Id.
88 See Biodiversity Convention, supra note 43, at 825.
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their conservation (Articles 8-9),89 about public education and awareness
(Article 13),"0 about genetic resources (Article 15),91 about technology
transfer (Article 16),92 and about financial resources in relation to defor-
estation as well as interesting suggestions for financial mechanisms (Arti-
cles 20-21). 9 'The Biodiversity Convention will need quite a lot of extra
work if it is ever going to have significant impact in halting the ever-
increasing extinction of species around the world. It contains a number
of technical problems, and it is hard to discern any workable overall
strategy within it which will allow achievement of its purposes.
F. Sustainable Development Commission
The last output from Rio was a commitment to set up a Sustainable
Development Commission,94 which is intended to be a new international
organization designed to monitor post-Rio developments. This may
sound like progress, but it is unclear that it is. In the negotiations, there
was a manifest failure to address the existing international institutions
which relate to the global environment" and the problem of coordina-
tion between those institutions. Indeed, the necessary restructuring so
often required in civil services at the domestic level seems to be more
difficult to accomplish at the international level. Many senior interna-
tional civil servants have an axe to grind, and they tend to grind re-
morselessly in their own interests. At Rio, some unkind people were
saying that the Sustainability Commission was really designed to provide
employment for the UNCED secretariat employees who otherwise faced
unemployment after the end of the Rio conference.96
There are five key problems with the international machinery relating
to the environment. 97 Methods of international negotiation in relation to
the environment are so cumbersome that it is almost impossible to nego-
tiate effectively. Also, it is hardly possible to obtain unanimous consent
89. Id. at 825-26.
90. Id. at 827.
91. Id. at 828.
92. Id. at 829.
93. Id. at 830-31.
94. See Agenda 21, supra note 34, ch. 38, passim.
95. Id.
96. Some delegates with whom I conversed at Rio openly discussed this.
97. See generally Geoffrey Palmer, New Ways to Make International Law, 86 A.J.I.L. 259
(1992); Symposium, The Role of International Law in Global Environmental Protection, 42 WASti.
U. J. URB. & CONTEMP. L. 3 (1992).
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on large and contentious issues such as global warming. Once an inter-
national convention has been negotiated, it is impossible to coerce people
into signing. Even if nations have ratified an international convention,
often it cannot be enforced effectively. Finally, it is not possible to coor-
dinate one international convention with another. More than 150 inter-
national environmental conventions have been negotiated in the last
thirty or forty years.98 Many of them contain overlapping provisions
although they have all been negotiated by different means. The decisions
made at Rio will not solve any of the five problems which exist with the
machinery of international environmental law.
The objectives of the institutions Chapter of Agenda 21 are clear:99
* to ensure and review the implementation of Agenda 21 so as to achieve
sustainable developments in all countries;
" to enhance the role and functioning of the U.N. system in the field of
environment and development;
" to strengthen cooperation and coordination and avoid duplication.10°
Chapter 38 of Agenda 21 states that the objectives are to be achieved
through the existing machinery comprising the General Assembly, the
Economic and Social Council, the specialized agencies, and the Commis-
sion on Sustainable Development. 101 At Rio it was decided that "specific
organizational modalities for the work of this Commission will be deter-
mined by the General Assembly at its forty-seventh session." 11 2 The
functions of the Commission are clear enough: to monitor the implemen-
tation of Agenda 21; to consider reports from governments on the imple-
mentation; and to review progress on implementation. At the same time,
it was decided that UNEP should be strengthened. However, there was a
complete failure to address the necessary task of institutional restructur-
ing within the U.N. relating to the environmental functions of UNEP
and other U.N. institutions. Unfortunately, we are likely to continue to
limp along in much the same fashion as before-with lack of clear juris-
diction, waste, duplication, and the absence of coordination.
G. Which paradigm?
The aftermath of Rio suggests three paradigmatic views of the global
98. See UNEP COMPENDIUM, supra note 15.
99. .4genda 21, supra note 34, ch. 38.
100. Id.
101. Id.
102. Id.
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environmental problem. The first view might be reasonably character-
ized as the laissez-faire approach. This approach suggests that, "by see-
ing technology, industry and free enterprise as the causes of
environmental problems, we make these problems worse."103 According
to this conservative paradigm, new technology, individual inventiveness,
and the market will develop appropriate mechanisms that will save us
from disaster."0 After all, capitalism is superior to everything else, and
we can rest our future on it with confidence.
The second paradigm teaches that it is necessary to intervene in mar-
ket decisions to protect the environment.105 The principles of sustainable
development provide a basis for this viewpoint.10 6 Development must be
analyzed in terms of its effects on ecology.10 7 The long-term conse-
quences for the planet's health, the atmosphere, the biosphere, the
oceans, and all the other problems of the global commons which no na-
tion can by itself control must be measured. So the sustainable develop-
ment view, which the Rio Declaration promotes, advocates the attractive
political vision that growth, economic development and ecological integ-
rity can co-exist.108 Within this rubric, the scope exists for free market
environmentalism. There is also space for increased consumption. We
can have our environmental cake and eat it too.
The third, more mournful view, is put forward by the deep ecolo-
103. James R. Dunn, America the Beautiful.- Accomplishments of Environmental Protection in
the US, NAT'L REV., July 6, 1992, at 34. See also Alan S. Blinder, What Wasn't on the Rio Agenda?
A Little Common Sense, Bus. WK., June 29, 1992, at 16. "The notion that we must eliminate
environmental hazards 'regardless of the cost' doesn't make economic sense. The only logical ap-
proach: compare costs and benefits and seek out the good deals." Id. For an excellent overview of
the various environmental schools of thinking, see CHRISTOPHER MANES, GREEN RAGE: RADICAL
ENVIRONMENTALISM AND THE UNMAKING OF CIVILIZATION (1990).
104. Murray L. Weidenbaum, Leviathan in Rio: The UN Gearing Up For its Massive 'Earth
Summit' in June, NAT'L REV., Apr. 27, 1992, at 44.
105. See generally SENATOR AL GORE, EARTH IN THE BALANCE: ECOLOGY AND THE HUMAN
SPIRIT (1992). See also BRUNDTLAND REPORT, supra note 22, at 67-91.
106. See also BRUNDTLAND REPORT, supra note 22, at 43-66, 76-91; Rio Declaration, supra
note 27, passim.
107. See BRUNDTLAND REPORT, supra note 22, at 67-91.
Two conditions must be satisfied before international economic exchanges can become ben-
eficial for all involved. The sustainability of ecosystems on which the global economy de-
pends must be guaranteed. And the economic partners must be satisfied that the basis of
exchange is equitable; relationships that are unequal and based on dominance of one kind
or another are not a sound and durable basis for interdependence.
Id. at 67.
108. See Rio Declaration, supra note 27, passim.
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gists."° The deep ecology view teaches that the present patterns of con-
sumption of the world's resources cannot continue at current levels.11o
Unless they are changed, we are all doomed. 11
For in Deep Ecology, the critical factor in this lemminglike march into
environmental oblivion is the narrowness of the moral community the civi-
lization complex recognizes. Because the majority tradition views the
world in utilitarian terms and refuses to include as part of its ethical com-
munity the plant and animal communities which sustain it, there is no re-
straint, at least in the short term, on its destruction of the natural world. In
the long run, of course, this myopic utilitarianism turns on itself by deplet-
ing the environment to the point that it can no longer be exploited as a
storehouse of natural resources." 2
There is a great deal more substance in the deep ecology view than
most policymakers are prepared to admit. The view is one which can be
seriously criticized because it fails to take into account the rational abil-
ity of people to assess the consequences of their own actions and take
remedial steps to change their behavior. People can think.
In the practical world of political decision making, short-term consid-
erations generally take priority over long-term solutions. Rio was in-
fected with this pragmatic mode of political thinking. But unless
political fixation with the immediate and the need for instant gratification
is quickly curtailed, the deep ecology view will prevail by default. It is
possible that deep ecology will prove to be valid anyway if the concept of
sustainable development turns out to be unworkable.
The problem is clear: unless we are able to advance sustainable devel-
opment rapidly and decisively, we will, in the end, fall victim to the re-
morseless logic of the deep ecology view. The available evidence shows
that we cannot continue as we have, and it ought to persuade us that we
must change. If we do not wholeheartedly embrace an aggressive stance
to implementing sustainable development, then we are doomed. The car-
rying capacity of the planet is limited-the evidence of that is all around
us. " 3 Unless effective measures are adopted, we are in trouble.
From the time Rio's agenda and format were agreed to in 1989, there
109. See, e.g., BILL DEVALL & GEORGE SESSIONS, DEEP ECOLOGY: LIVING AS IF NATURE
MATTERED (1985); Arne Naess, Deep Ecology and Ultimate Premises, 18 ECOLOGIST 128 (1988).
See also MANES, supra note 103, at 139-50.
110. See supra note 57 and accompanying text.
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were significant political changes in the world which influenced the out-
come of Rio. The Western economies have slipped into a recession, and
as a result, the environment is not as attractive an issue as it had been
due to the costs associated with implementation of sustainable develop-
ment policies. The fires of change burn less fiercely when jobs and eco-
nomic growth are at stake. Thus, while the sustainability paradigm was
chosen at Rio, it was not embraced with sufficient determination, rigor or
commitment to ensure that it happens.
H. Conclusion
Twenty years after Stockholm, we are deeper in the mire and no closer
to getting out. The biggest diplomatic gathering in the history of the
world, which more world leaders attended than any international confer-
ence before,"' did not summon up the collective political resolve neces-
sary to deal with the global environmental challenge. Progress was,
simply, insufficient, due to a general failure of political will.
Rio produced too little, too late. Certainly, Rio had the effect of rais-
ing peoples' awareness of the global environmental issues in a way about
which we should be optimistic and hopeful. Changing of attitudes and
education are vitally important in this field. In the end, however, action
is required to address the problems. We have had plenty of rhetoric-the
time for rhetoric is past. The time for binding international instruments
that actually produce change has arrived.
Rio conjures up warm visions of exotic romance at Copacabana and
Ipanema. The occasion was rich in symbolism; everyone wanted some-
thing to happen. Perhaps it was a start. But how many new dawns must
we endure before real, substantive progress is achieved? There were in-
sufficient accomplishments at Rio to make us confident about the future
of the global environment.
114. See supra note 9.
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